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EXPLORING THE PEDIGREE OF THE 
WATCHDOG METAPHOR 
by 
Roy A. Chandler, University of Wales, Cardiff 
The j u d g e m e n t of Lord Lopes, In 
Kingston Cotton Mill, (The Accountant Law 
Reports, May 23, 1896, p. 78), produced 
what is probably the best known quotation 
in the audi t ing literature: "the auditor is a 
watchdog but not a bloodhound." However, 
his Lordship's use of the canine analogy was 
not original; he was merely developing upon 
a phrase in common parlance at the t ime. 
The first reported use of the watchdog 
metaphor to appear in The Accountant was 
at t r ibuted to an altogether different type of 
Victorian, the Reverend Dr. Dawson Burns 
who , more than two years before the 
Kingston Cotton Mill decision, was quoted 
as having said: 
W h a t is an auditor? H e ought to be 
very much like a watch-dog: very care-
ful to listen for any suspicious sound: 
able to bark and, perhaps even to bit if 
necessary. The peculiarity of his position 
is this, that whereas the watch-dog has 
to watch those outside, he has to watch 
those who are inside. He has to take care 
that those who manage the accounts do 
their business properly (The Westminster 
Gazette reproduced in The Accountant, 
April 2 1 , 1894, p. 354). 
This revelation would perhaps be 
insignificant were it not for a remarkable 
irony: the reverend doctor was a director in 
some of the Balfour companies, a group 
which included the largest building society 
in Britian, the Liberator Permanent Building 
Society, and the London and General Bank 
(which became involved in the second land-
mark auditing case of the 1890s). This group 
was responsible for the biggest crime of the 
nineteenth century, a fraud involving the loss 
to investors of a total of £8m. (equivalent to 
about £400m. at today's prices). The money 
was lost through the failure of speculative 
investments and the burden of financing a 
lavish lifestyle for the directors. The fraud 
was masked by various "creative accounting" 
techniques, which became the blue-print for 
corporate frauds throughout the twent ie th 
century. Group companies wi th different 
year-ends circulated money between them-
selves to provide a temporary appearance of 
solvency; intra-group sales at inflated prices 
produced illusory profits in the accounts of 
the individual companies', unpaid interest 
was treated as income; and, the failure to pro-
vide for bad debts further overstated profits. 
Investors received good returns on their 
deposits and shareholdings but, wi th no gen-
uine t rading profits being earned, these 
returns were paid out of capital, or more cor-
rectly, customers' deposits. 
Master-minding this elaborate scheme of 
deceit was Jebez Balfour, Dr. Burns' brother-
in-law. Balfour was able to hoodwink deposi-
tors and investors because none of the audi-
tors of the companies in the group possessed 
the qualities of a true watchdog. In fact, the 
real position only became known when the 
cash ran out. The Liberator, and the rest of 
the Balfour group, collapsed in September 
1892 bringing misery to the thousands of 
savers who had believed the Liberator's slo-
gan, "As safe as the Bank of England." The 
ensuing panic among investors resulted in a 
run on other societies, some of which also col-
lapsed. The whole episode set back the build-
ing societies' movement by 30 years. 
The protagonists also suffered, though 
not in equal measure. Criminal and civil pro-
ceedings were started against those in charge 
of the group. Balfour, having been extradited 
from Argentina, was tried, convicted and 
jailed for 14 years. 
The Reverend Dawson Burns escaped 
this fate and much of the criticism since he 
had resigned from the board of the Liberator 
in 1886 on the grounds, according to the 
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entry in the Dict ionary of Nat ional 
Biography, of his disagreement wi th increases 
in directors' fees. An alternative rather less 
forgiving explanation suggested that Burns 
resigned in order to devote more t ime to his 
other directorships in the Balfour group, 
including the London and General Bank. By 
withdrawing all his deposits shortly before 
the group's crash, Burns also made sure that 
he did not share the same fate as the hapless 
investors and depositors. 
Whatever his faults, Burns, more than 
Lord Lopes, deserves to be credited wi th 
coining the watchdog metaphor, a phrase 
which immediately became popular wi th 
those wri t ing on audi t ing matters: 
I have heard of such things as watch-
dogs being drugged, and it is even pos-
sible that an auditor may be misin-
formed and led astray by the officers of 
the company, (a letter to The Westminster 
Gazette, reproduced in The Accountant, 
April 2 1 , 1894, p. 356). 
The auditor ought to be the watch-
dog of the jo in t stock company, and a 
watchdog who takes his instruction 
from the wolf is not of much use in the 
sheepfold. {The Financial News repro-
duced in The Accountant, June 16, 1894, 
p. 535). 
An effective watch-dog, to use the 
catch word that has found favour in this 
connection, must be unmuzzled and 
unchained—how often can it be said 
that the auditor is not muzzled by the 
limitations of his powers, and chained 
by the apathy of his employers?, {The 
Accountant, July 28, 1894, p . 657). 
The watch-dog which barks furiously 
at inoffensive strangers, is far more use-
ful than one which wags its tail at a bur-
glar, {The Birmingham Gazette repro-
duced in The Accountant, October 20, 
1894, p . 913). 
The great bulk of shareholders feel 
that the auditor is their watch-dog, {The 
Western Press reproduced in The Account-
ant, November 17, 1894, p. 1020). 
It is interesting that one writer in par-
ticular, F.W. Pixley, considered the te rm 
"watchdog" to be an altogether inappropriate 
description of the role of auditor. However, 
Pixley's reluctance to embrace the popular 
idiom may have been due to his particular 
predicament-he was facing questions before a 
court during the inquiry into the bankruptcy 
of a former audit client, Woodhouse and 
Rawson United. On June 18, 1894, he stren-
uously denied that he was in any sense a 
"watchdog" over the directors {The Accountant 
Law Reports, June 30, 1894, p. 121). In so 
saying, he was perhaps a t tempt ing to dis-
tance himself from the actions of the com-
pany directors and the consequences thereof. 
Al though Lord Lopes' remark has fre-
quently been cited by members of the j u d i -
ciary only one Canadian case has signifi-
cantly developed the watchdog metaphor, 
International Laboratories v. Dewar (1933 1 
DLR 34, reproduced in The Accountant, 
October 28, 1933, pp. 689-703): 
As I understand it, the useful work of 
a watch-dog is based on the fact that he 
is expected, particularly if he be in the 
dark, to raise an alarm whenever he sees 
or hears anything unusual, and, if a pos-
sible marauder appears to be approach-
ing, to continue his combined protests 
and threats with two objects in view: (1) 
that the cause of the fancied threat be 
withdrawn; and (2) that his master may 
be aroused to his danger; and only when 
one of these objects has been accom-
plished will he be considered to have 
discharged the duties of the position 
which he assumed. 
He will not have performed the func-
tions of his office if, after one howl, he 
retreats "under the barn," or if he con-
fines his protest to a fellow watch-dog. 
The watchdog analogy has withstood 
the test of t ime so effectively that it is still 
regularly used in connection not only wi th 
auditors, bu t also wi th many other oversight 
or regulatory activities. However, credit for 
authorship of the phrase should perhaps go to 
a Victorian clergyman rather than an appel-
late judge . 
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